Hossein sheykhrezaee; Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht
Abstract
The issue of the role of social and cultural values in science has provoked many debates in the last few decades and researchers in science studies have approached the issue in different ways. The proponents of feminist science and epistemology are among those who have paid much attention to the issue. ...
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The issue of the role of social and cultural values in science has provoked many debates in the last few decades and researchers in science studies have approached the issue in different ways. The proponents of feminist science and epistemology are among those who have paid much attention to the issue. Some of the feminists believe that values play an undeniable role in the products of science. In particular, masculine values, they claim, have an essential role in the current scientific theories. Some of them even try to argue for the view that masculine values should be replaced with feminine ones. However, some other feminists reject the view, and among them is Helen Longino. Although Longino admits that masculine values have played some role in many scientific theories, she denies that there is a unique set of feminine superior values. In this paper, we examined Longino’s view on the role of values in science as well as feminist science. We criticized two elements of her view
Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht; amir ehsan karbasizade
Volume 8, Issue 16 , March 2019, , Pages 19-41
Abstract
The problem of old evidence allegedly poses the most serious challenge to the Bayesian confirmation theory. All proposed solutions to this problem can be divided into two types: classical (treating the challenge as serious and trying to meet it) and non-classical (with denying that there is a real problem ...
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The problem of old evidence allegedly poses the most serious challenge to the Bayesian confirmation theory. All proposed solutions to this problem can be divided into two types: classical (treating the challenge as serious and trying to meet it) and non-classical (with denying that there is a real problem and trying to dissolve it in one way or another). Classical solutions have been proposed by Garber, Jeffery, and Niiniluoto, and have been criticized by many, among them, Eells and Earman. One of the non-classical solutions is to choose an objective (rather than Bayesian’s subjective) interpretation of probability; this view has been proposed by Rosenkrantz. In this paper, we thoroughly examine the classical solutions and objections that have been raised against them, trying to show that the classical approach is deficient. In the end, we try to make a case for Rosenkrantz’s proposal as the only solution which, we believe, gets to the root of the problem correctly